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THE MATERIALITY STANDARD AFTER MA TRIXXINITIA TIVES, INC.
V. SIRACUSANO

Benjamin Shook*

The recent, unanimous decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano resolved a circuit split on
the materiality standard under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. By affirming the Ninth Circuit, the Court
re-establishedthe materialitystandardset forth twenty-three years
ago in Basic Inc. v. Levinson. Although the Court relied heavily
on this past decision, it did provide some guidance to
pharmaceuticalcompanies regardingthe disclosure requirements
of adverse event reports. With the circuit split now settled, it
appears that adverse event reports, standing alone, will generally
not be enough to satisfy the materiality standard. However, when
in conjunction with affirmative statements concerning the safety
and profitability of the drug, these adverse event reports may be
material as to not make the statements made misleading. The
question remains whether normal advertising of the drug would
breach this threshold and require the disclosure of the adverse
event reports.
I. INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court's unanimous decision in
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano' on March 22, 2011,
resolved a circuit split by affirming the Ninth Circuit's standard of
materiality for patient and physician reports under Rule 1Ob-5 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act").2 In doing so,
the Court rejected the standard established by the First, Second,
J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2012. 1 would
like to thank my parents, Bill and Martha Shook, for all their love and support.
'No. 09-1156 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2011).
2 See General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17
C.F.R.

§ 240.1Ob-5 (2011).
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and Third Circuits. The issue arose out of patient and physician
reports of adverse effects of using the over-the-counter drug
Zicam.4 The Ninth Circuit held that the materiality of the reports
under Rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Act was not dependent on the
statistical significance of these complaints,' contrary to holdings by
the First, Second, and Third Circuit Courts.
Zicam is one of the primary products sold by Matrixx
Initiatives, Inc. ("Matrixx"). ' It is sold in numerous forms overthe-counter for use as a cold remedy.' Some of these forms are
swabs and gel that contain zinc, designed for intranasal
application.' As early as 1999, users of these Zicam products
began to experience the loss of smell.' 0 As a publicly traded
company, Matrixx is required to comply with certain disclosure
requirements of the 1934 Act." Matrixx, as it became aware of
these adverse events associated with Zicam use, did not disclose
this information on its formal reports to the Securities Exchange
Commission ("SEC") and affirmatively denied the validity of these
events in press releases. 2 As a result, a group of shareholders
brought a class action law suit against Matrixx under the anti-fraud
provisions of the 1934 Act, alleging that Matrixx violated Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 "by failing to disclose material information
regarding Zicam Cold Remedy."

Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, No. 09-1156 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2011).
Id., slip op. at 2-3.
5 Siracusano v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 585 F.3d 1167, 1178-79 (9th Cir.
2009).
6
See General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
7
See Bruce W. Jafek, Zicam and Loss of Smell, THE NEWS. OF C.
AESCULAPIUM (LDS MED. PROF. COMMUNITY), July 2009, at 1.
8 Siracusano,585 F.3d at 1170.
9 Jafek, supra note 7, at 1 (explaining further the effects of intranasal
application of zinc gluconate).
'oSee Siracusano, 585 F.3d at 1169 n.1 (physician reported at least one
patient had developed anosmia).
"See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2006).
12See infra notes 17 and 19.
'3Siracusano,585 F.3d at 1169-70.
4
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This Recent Development will first introduce the facts of
Siracusano. Next, it will discuss the statutes and judicial precedent
applicable to this case and continue with a discussion about the
District Court's and Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Siracusano. Part
IV will analyze the recent Supreme Court decision, and this Recent
Development will conclude with a discussion of the implications
of this decision going forward.
11. MATRIXX INITIATIVES, INC. V. SIRACUSANO

Matrixx is a pharmaceutical company and a large distributor of
cold medication.14 Zicam is one of Matrixx's main products and is
sold over the counter as a cold remedy." Siracusanov. Matrixx is
a class action law suit filed by current shareholders against Matrixx
for a violation of Rule lOb-516 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 regarding disclosure of material information concerning the
potential adverse effects of using their pharmaceutical products."
The complaint alleged that Matrixx, in failing to disclose the
potential link between Zicam and anosmia,'" violated Section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act.' 9 Between December 1999 and April 2004,
Matrixx received various adverse event reports and became aware
of at least one academic study that was conducted by researchers at
the University of Colorado about patients suffering from anosmia,
allegedly due to Zicam use.20

During this same period, Matrixx

14 Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, No. 09-1156, slip op. at 2 (U.S. Mar.
22, 2011).
1
16

Id; see also supranote 7.
17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2010).

17 Siracusano, No. 09-1156, slip op. at 3-4 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2011) (alleging
Matrixx failed to disclose a number of adverse event reports from physicians
and researchers, the fact that there were pending lawsuits stemming from use of
Zicam, and research conducted by University of Colorado researchers).
"Id.at 3.
'9 Id.at 7.
20 Id. at 3-4. In December 1999, Matrixx was informed by Dr. Alan Hirsch
that at least one patient had developed anosmia, or loss of smell, in conjunction
with the use of Zicam, and that studies existed which suggested "potential
problems with 'intranasal application of zinc."' Sirucausano, 585 F.3d at 1170.
Then, in September 2002, Matrixx executives were informed that studies
conducted at the University of Colorado showed a link between the use of zinc
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issued several reports in various press releases and filings with the
Securities Exchange Commission2 showing positive profit
potential for the Zicam brand and denying any allegations of a
connection between Zicam use and anosmia.22 In February 2004,
Good Morning America reported on these potential problems
associated with Zicam use and also reported that there were four
product liability lawsuits pending against Matrixx alleging that
Zicam use caused plaintiffs' anosmia. After this report, the
Matrixx common stock price fell 23.8% in one day.23
In response to Good Morning America's report, Matrixx issued
a press release stating that any link between anosmia and zinc
gluconate intranasal gels, such as Zicam, was "completely
unfounded and misleading." 24 On February 19, 2004, Matrixx
ultimately filed a Form 8-K25 stating that there was no sufficient
and anosmia. In September 2003, the University of Colorado researchers were
prepared to present data regarding ten patients who developed anosmia after
using Zicam. Matrixx refused to allow the researches to use the Zicam name
during the presentation. Id. By April 2004, University of Colorado researchers
reported that there had been approximately 165 cases of anosmia associated with
Zicam. Id. at 1171.
21 See infra note 22. See generally THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION

§ 9.3[1][A] (6th ed. 2009) (summarizing that

annual reports must be filed on a Form 10-K, quarterly reports must be filed on a
Form 10-Q, and these reports must be supplemented on a Form 8-K on the
occurrences of certain major events which has moved in recent years to a system
closer to continuous disclosure).
22 Siracusano,No. 09-1156, slip op. at 4-6 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2011). On October
22, 2003, Matrixx announced a third quarter sales increase and that "[t]he Zicam
brand is poised for growth . . . " Id. at 4. Further, in a press release dated
January 7, 2004, the company announced an expected revenue growth. In the
face of a Dow Jones Newswires report stating, "the FDA was 'looking into
complaints that an over-the-counter common-cold medicine manufactured by a
unit of Matrixx Initiatives Inc. (MTXX) may be causing some users to lose their
sense of smell,"' Matrixx stated that "[i]n no clinical trial of intranasal zinc
gluconate gel products has there been a single report of lost or diminished
olfactory function." Id. at 5-6. On February 19, 2004 Matrixx filed a Form 8-K
with the SEC stating it had conducted a meeting with physicians and scientists
and that there was "insufficient scientific evidence . . . to determine if zinc

gluconate ... affects a person's ability to smell." Id. at 7.
23 Sirucausano,585 F.3d at
1174.
24 Id.
25 See HAZEN, supranote 21,
§ 9.3[1][A].
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evidence to support a link between Zicam use and anosmia.2
However, on June 16, 2009, the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") informed Matrixx that Zicam "may pose a serious risk to
consumers." 27
III. BACKGROUND LAW
A. The 1934 Act

The 1934 Act was promulgated mainly as an investor
protection statute to prevent any fraud in conjunction with the
offering of securities and to increase investor awareness and
confidence in securities offerings after the stock market crash of
1929.28 The anti-fraud provisions of the 1934 Act are stated, in
part, in Section 10(b) and further codified by the SEC in Rule 1Ob5.29 Under these anti-fraud provisions, a private right of action
exists where the plaintiffs are shareholders and the defendant
company is publicly traded and subject to the requirements of the
1934 Act.30 Further, "[t]o state a claim under Section 10(b) [of the
1934 Act], 15 U.S.C. 78j(b),[1 ] and Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240. 10b5,[ 3 2] appellants must allege: (1) a misstatement or
omission (2) of material fact (3) made with scienter (4) on which
See supra note 22.
Siracusano, No. 09-1156, slip op. at 14 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2011).
28 See HAZEN, supra note 21, §§ 9.0-9.1
(stating the 1934 Act has a broad
purpose of regulating virtually every aspect of securities transactions; this Act
created the Securities Exchange Commission and has broad power to regulate
both securities markets and the securities industry).
29 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5(b) (2010).
30 See HAZEN, supra note 21, § 9.2[1][A] (stating all securities
traded on a
national exchange must be registered pursuant to the 1934 Act's requirements.
Additionally, large non-publicly traded companies with assets over ten million
dollars and more than 500 shareholders of record must register under the 1934
Act).
31 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).
32 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (stating in part, "[i]t shall be
unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities
exchange . .. (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading").
26
27
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Appellants relied (5) which proximately caused their injury."" In
Siracusano, the Supreme Court resolved the issue of what
constitutes a material fact under the 1934 Act as applied to
pharmaceutical companies.34
B. In the Courts
1. U.S. Supreme Court's Materiality Under Section 10(b) of the
1934 Act
The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed the standard for the
materiality element of a Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claim in
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson." Basic involved merger negotiations
between two companies, and the plaintiffs in that case alleged
material misrepresentations by the target company.36 The target
company, while in the middle of the merger discussions, made
three public statements denying the negotiations and stating that
they were not aware of any company developments which
explained the high trading activity and prices in the company's
stock."
In Basic, the Court relied on TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway,
Inc." to establish the standard for determining materiality under
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act." Although TSC involved Section
14(a) of the 1934 Act,40 the Court explicitly applied the same
standard of materiality under Section 10(b).41 In TSC, the Court
stated that "[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important in deciding how to vote."42 The Basic Court further
3 DSAM Global Value Fund v. Altris Software, Inc., 288 F.3d 385, 388
(2002).
34 Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, No. 09-1156 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2011).
3 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
6
Id. at 227-28
SId. at 228.
38 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
39
Basic, 485 U.S. at 232.
40 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2 (2010) (relating to the regulation of solicitations of
proxies).
41 See Basic, 485 U.S. at 232 ("We now expressly adopt the TSC Industries
standard of materiality for the § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 context.").
42 TSC Indus., 426 U.S.
at 449.
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clarified that "to fulfill the materiality requirement 'there must be a
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would
have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made
available."' 43
The Basic Court acknowledged that in TSC, "the Court was
careful not to set too low a standard of materiality" because a
lower standard could potentially "bring an overabundance of
information within its reach."'
Furthermore, the Court was
specifically concerned that an overflow of trivial information into
the market could obscure the truth and hinder effective decisionmaking.4 5 Though the Supreme Court's decision in Basic was
based in the context of merger negotiations, it has been applied in
numerous cases and contexts since then.4 6 However, because of
the unique characteristics of pharmaceutical companies, this
standard has been applied differently by the lower courts in these
cases.
2. The CircuitSplit: The Circuits' MaterialityStandards Under
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act
When applying the materiality standard to pharmaceutical
companies, one must turn first to the Carter-Wallace, Inc.47 line of
cases from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.48
43 Basic, 485 U.S. at 231-32 (quoting TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449).

Id. at 231.
See Basic, 485 U.S. at 231; see also TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 448-49 (stating
that it could result in burying "the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial
information-a result that is hardly conducive to informed decisionmaking").
46See e.g., Day v. Staples, 555 F.3d 42, 57 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing the Basic
standard for materiality in conjunction with securities fraud claim).
47 In re Carter-Wallace, Inc. Sec. Litig., 150 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998) ("CarterWallace I"); In re Carter-Wallace, Inc. Sec. Litig., 220 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2000)
("Carter-Wallace 11").
48 Carter-Wallace I was heard by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and
reversed and remanded on the grounds that advertisements could be considered
in connection with a securities transaction but affirmed on the ground that
plaintiff had failed to allege a material misrepresentation. Carter-Wallace 1, 150
F.3d at 157. Carter-Wallace11 was heard again on appeal by the Second Circuit
and affirmed the district court on the grounds that plaintiff had failed to allege
scienter. Carter-Wallace II, 220 F.3d at 37-38.
4
45
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These cases involved the use of an epilepsy drug, Felbatol, and
potential side effects from its use.4 9 Similar to Siracusano, in
Carter-Wallace the drug manufacturer became aware that some
patients developed various illnesses, such as aplastic anemia, 0
while simultaneously running advertisements in medical journals
promoting the safety and effectiveness of the medication." During
this time, Carter-Wallace was informed by physicians of "at least
fifty-seven adverse medical reports relating to Felbatol, including
at least six deaths and six cases of aplastic anemia."52 The next
month, Carter-Wallace recommended the discontinuance of
Felbatol treatment. Upon disclosure of this information, the
company's stock prices fell almost thirty-three percent in one

day. 53
In reaching its decision in Carter-Wallace II, the Second
Circuit reasoned that since the reports received by Carter-Wallace
prior to their withdrawal of the medication "did not demonstrate a
statistically significant link between Felbatol and any illness,"5 4
plaintiffs had failed to allege facts sufficient to meet the materiality
The court
requirement of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.
reasoned that Carter-Wallace had no viable grounds to question the
success of Felbatol until the negative reports reached statistical
significance. 56 The Carter-Wallace court was concerned that
randomly associated illnesses could skew the actual potential value
of the drug. Specifically, the court reasoned that, "some adverse
events may be expected to occur randomly, especially with a drug

See Carter-WallaceII, 220 F.3d at 38.
50 Id.; see Michael C. Mackey, Unified Hypothesis for the Origin of Aplastic
Anemia and Periodic Hematopoiesis, 51 BLOOD No. 5, 941, 942 (May 1978)
(defining aplastic anemia as a blood condition in which blood cells are not being
produced by bone marrow).
5' See Carter-WallaceII, 220 F.3d at 38.
52 id
49

5 Id ("[F]ollowing disclosure . .. Carter-Wallace's common stock fell $4.875
per share, almost 33 percent, from $15.625 to $10.75 on heavy trading.").
54
Id at 40.
5 Id
56
Id at 41.
57
Id

SPIGNG 2011]

Matnxx Initiatives,Inc. v. Siracusano

377

designed to treat people that are already ill."" As such, the
standard set forth by the Second Circuit, as it applies to
pharmaceutical companies, is that absent any statistically
significant data to support a causal connection between adverse
events and the use of the drug, the company is under no obligation
to report the adverse events."
Similar to the Second Circuit's decision in Carter-Wallace, the
Third and First Circuit Courts of Appeals also adopted the
statistical significance standard of materiality in Rule lOb-5 cases.
In Oran v. Stafford,60 the Third Circuit held that there was no
obligation to report information linking two drugs to heart valve
disorders unless that information was statistically significant.6'
Similarly, in N.J. CarpentersPension andAnnuity Funds v. Biogen
Idec Inc.,62 the First Circuit, referring to a statement that the
occurrence of even one adverse event is significant enough to put
the drug's safety and marketability in question, the court held that
"[i]n the absence of an allegation or inference of proof of any
statistical significance of the occurrence . .. the statement is simply

not true and is also incorrect as a matter of law."" The First
Circuit based this ruling, in part, on the Supreme Court's reasoning
in Basic when it stated, "information is material if a reasonable
investor would have viewed it as 'having significantly altered the
total mix of information made available.'"" Thus, the First,
Second, and Third Circuit Courts have established a materiality
standard which requires an allegation that the claimed adverse
event is statistically significant to the use of the drug in question.
However, this standard has not always been so strictly applied.
In In re Pfizer Inc.,65 'a district court in the Second Circuit refused
58 Id.

59

1d. at 40.

60

226 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2000).

Id. at 284 (stating "[t]he withheld reports did not provide such statistically
significant evidence.").
62 537 F.3d 35 (1st Cir.
2008).
63 Id. at
50.
64 Id. at 44 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988))
(emphasis added)).
65 584 F. Supp. 2d 621 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
61
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to apply the statistical significance standard and instead relied on a
strict interpretation of the Basic standard. The court in that case,
while acknowledging Carter-Wallace and Oran,66 held that adverse
event reports, even if not statistically significant, may be material.6 7
The court, in further distinguishing the statistical significance
standard, stated that a 5% threshold for statistical significance
could not be used "as a basis for rejecting the significance of
complicated medical studies."6 ' Based on this court's reasoning,
even if statistical significance could be used as a standard for
materiality, it is unclear where the line of significance should be
drawn. As such, the materiality standard remained somewhat of a
mystery prior to the Siracusanodecision.
3. The Lower Court Decisions
Siracusano was first heard in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Arizona where the court decided that the plaintiffs had
failed to allege facts sufficient to state a valid securities fraud
claim.69 The district court relied on the Second and Third Circuits'
reasoning in dismissing the plaintiffs' claims.70 Following the
Second Circuit's standard, the district court found that the omitted
information concerning the possible side-effects of Zicam use was
not based on statistically significant scientific data." The court
reasoned that, not only was there no evidence of the statistical
significance of the adverse events reported, but the allegation that
Matrixx was aware of only twelve complaints, even if they were
reliable, was not enough in itself to meet the statistical significance
standard." Thus, the plaintiffs' claim failed because it did not
allege that Matrixx had any knowledge of the statistical
significance, and they did not present any independent evidence of
Id at 636 (stating, "the decisions 'do not hold that adverse event reports are
always immaterial"' (quoting In re Bayer AG Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 1546
WHP,
67 2004 WL 2190357, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004))).
Id. at 636.
68 Id. at 634.
69 Siracusano v. Matrixx Initiatives Inc., No. CIV-04-0886-PHX-MHM,
2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41102, at *22 (D. Ariz. Dec. 15, 2005).
7
oId.at *15-20.
66

' Id. at *22.
72 Id.
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the statistical significance of the adverse events reported."
Moreover, Matrixx was not provided with any evidence of the
statistical significance, the methodology used, or the peer review
status of the University of Colorado study.74 Therefore, without
any allegation that Matrixx knew of or had such evidence, the
plaintiffs failed to state a cognizable claim."
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed this decision and rejected
the requirement of statistical significance to determine
materiality."6 The Ninth Circuit held instead that the significance
of information is a matter of fact and thus should be left to the trier
of fact to determine the materiality based on a totality of the
circumstances.
This court also relied on the Supreme Court's
language in Basic relating to the expectations of a reasonable
shareholder."
Thus, the Ninth Circuit rejected a bright line
standard based on statistical significance and instead adopted a
fact-specific inquiry." As a result of this decision, the court
viewed the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
and determined that the plaintiffs had stated a valid claim and
remanded the case for a decision on the facts."o While the Ninth
Circuit based this decision on Supreme Court precedent properly
applied in other securities settings, as the Supreme Court later
noted, this standard may not provide the precision required by the
pharmaceutical industry.
This decision resulted in a circuit split on the materiality
standard for Rule lOb-5. As such, the Supreme Court granted a
writ of certiorarito hear this case and decide whether information
concerning potential negative effects of pharmaceutical products
73

74

id.

id.
Siracusano v. Matrixx Initiatives Inc., No. CIV-04-0886-PHX-MHM, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41102, at *27 (D. Ariz. Dec. 15, 2005).
76 Siracusano v. Matrixx Initiatives Inc., 585 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2009), cert.
granted,78 U.S.L.W. 3728 (U.S. June 14, 2010) (No. 09-1156).
77
1d. at 1179-80.
78 Id. at 1178 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988)).
79 Id. at 1179 ("[W]e are to engage in the fact-specific inquiry required by
Basic.").
7

so Id.
81 Id.
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must be reported under Rule lOb-5 as material information
notwithstanding a lack of statistically significant information to
support the causal connection.8 2
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
On March 22, 2011, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth
Circuit's decision in this case and, in so doing, reaffirmed the
materiality standard first established in Basic." The Court first
noted that Matrixx's argument required the Court "to adopt a
bright-line rule that reports of adverse events associated with a
pharmaceutical company's products cannot be material absent a
sufficient number of such reports to establish a statistically
significant risk that the product is in fact causing the events."84 The
Court rejected this argument by restating the Court's language in
Basic that, "[a]ny approach that designates a single fact or
occurrence as always determinative of an inherently fact-specific
finding such as materiality, must necessarily be overinclusive or
underinclusive." 5 Thus, the Court affirmed the fact-specific
inquiry required by the Ninth Circuit.
The Court went on to hold that statistical significance is not the
only measure of causation. Medical experts and court-approved
expert testimony often rely on many types of evidence other than
statistical significance to infer causation." The FDA, the Court
noted specifically, considers many factors beyond statistical
significance to determine causation." In addition, the FDA may
make regulatory decisions based on "evidence that gives rise to
only a suspicion of causation.""
The Court, after rejecting the bright-line rule, restated the "total
mix" standard established in Basic and determined that "assessing
the materiality of adverse event reports is a 'fact-specific'
82

id.

Matrixx Initiatives Inc. v. Siracusano, No. 09-1156, slip op. (U.S. Mar.
22,
2011).
84
Id. at 10-11.
85 Id. at 10 (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988)).
6
Id. at 12.
" Id. at 13.
88
Id. at 14.
83
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inquiry."" However, the Court also noted that the "mere existence
of reports of adverse events . . . will not satisfy this standard."o As

such, there must be something more. In this case, the Court seems
to emphasize that the adverse event reports, combined with the
scientific evidence available to Matrixx, was enough to alter the
"total mix" of information available. The Court went on to hold
that the allegations in this case "suffice to 'raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence' satisfying the
materiality requirement.""
Moreover, the Court notes "that § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5(b) do
not create an affirmative duty to disclose any and all
information."9 2 In so stating, the Court points to the fact that
Matrixx made several affirmative statements concerning the
company's potential profits while aware of information that posed
a "significant risk to its leading revenue-generating product.""
The affirmative denial of the reports and scientific evidence
created statements which, in the face of this evidence, could be
viewed as misleading and could significantly alter the "total mix"
of information available. As such, because these affirmative
statements were made, the reports and the scientific data became
material "in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading."94
Unlike the circuit courts, the Supreme Court looked more into the
actions of Matrixx and not merely the independent significance of
the adverse event reports or scientific studies. This approach
provides, not only a more reliable basis of materiality, but
conforms more closely to the Courts reasoning in Basic."
89 Id. at 15.
90Id. at 16.
91 Id. at 18 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556
(2007)).
9
2 Id. at 16.
9 Id. at 19.
94 Id. at 19 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2010)).
9
See generally Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (rejecting a
bright line rule of agreement-in-principle for merger negotiations and finding
that the companies' affirmative denials of engaging in merger negotiations while
in the process of negotiating a merger contributed to the materiality of the
negotiations regardless of any agreement).
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION

Pharmaceutical companies are in a rare position of
vulnerability to securities class action lawsuits. 6 Other industries
do not face the uncertainties involved in drug manufacturing or the
broad swings in stock prices with which pharmaceutical companies
The high risks and rewards associated with
must deal."
prospective new drugs attract investors and boost stock prices in
these companies." But when these promising new drugs turn out
to not be the panacea the investing public hoped for, the resulting
big losses foster an unusually high number of class action
lawsuits.99 The high costs of litigation, combined with the
uncertainty of disclosure requirements pose undue hardship on
these companies. As one court stated, "securities laws do not exist
to provide down-side investment insurance."' 0 This Supreme
Court decision does little to clarify the reporting requirements for
pharmaceutical companies.
This decision does, however, provide more than the standard
explained in the Ninth Circuit's decision. The Court emphasized
the fact that Matrixx, in light of the information available,
continued to make affirmative statements concerning the
profitability of the company and safety of the drug.'0 ' In making
these statements, the Court determined that the adverse events,
which may have not been material on their own, became material
so as to not make the affirmative statements misleading.' 2
Therefore, it seems that pharmaceutical companies have been put
on notice to closely monitor the status of the adverse event reports
they receive and fully evaluate them prior to any affirmative
statements which may be contrary. Specifically, the Court did
96 Stuart R. Cohn & Erin M. Swick, The Sitting Ducks of Securities Class
Action Litigation: Bio-Pharmas and the Need for Improved Evaluation of
Scientific Data,35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 911, 915 (2010).
97
Id at 912.
98 Id

9 Id.
'oo In re Northfield Labs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 769, 784 (N.D. Ill.
2007).
'' Matrixx Initiatives Inc. v. Siracusano, No. 09-1156, slip op. at 19 (U.S.
Mar. 22, 2011).
102 Id. at 18-19.
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recognize that adverse events were common-place in the
pharmaceutical industry, and, in an effort to reduce the burden on
these companies, the Court held that "[a]pplication of Basic's 'total
mix' standard does not mean that pharmaceutical manufacturers
must disclose all reports of adverse events.""o3 Therefore, there is
some solace in this opinion for pharmaceutical companies. As the
Court states, "companies can control what they have to disclose
under these provisions by controlling what they say to the
market."'"
However, this leaves open the question of how much a
company can say to the public. For instance, in Carter-Wallace,
the company, while aware of the adverse events, continued to
advertise in medical journals.o It is unclear, based on this recent
decision, whether the continuation of normal advertising by a
pharmaceutical company would qualify as an affirmative statement
thus making the adverse event reports material. For example,
would a company who is running an advertising campaign on
television, the internet, and in medical journals have to cease the
advertising when it became aware of certain adverse events?
One potential answer to this question comes from the
Securities Act of 1933.106 Under Section 5(c)o7 of that act,
regarding prohibitions related to the offering of securities, a
company in the process of a public offering of securities is
restricted as to what information it may provide to the public.'
However, the SEC has stated that normal advertising of products
would not be considered a violation of this requirement.' 9 The
SEC may view normal advertising in the Rule lOb-5 context in the
same way as it does in the context of public offerings. If that is the
case, it is highly likely that Carter-Wallace would be decided the
same way under the "total mix" standard today. In any event,
10Id. at 15.
'04d. at 16.
105 See supra note
48.
106 See generally 15 U.S.C. §
77 (2006).
'0' 15 U.S.C. § 77(e)(C) (2006).
108 Id.

109 See HAZEN, supra note 21, § 2.3[5] (6th ed. 2009) (stating that issuers
should "[c]ontinue to advertise products and services").
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pharmaceutical companies should be vigilant in monitoring the
adverse events and their advertising endeavors to ensure
compliance with the reporting requirements.
In addition, the Court recognizes the limitations of statistical
significance on the practical implications of adverse events. The
FDA relies on many factors to determine whether a drug warrants
Increased FDA regulation, the
certain regulatory action.'1o
issuance of FDA warnings concerning a drug, or the imposition of
additional testing by the FDA all could have a detrimental effect
These are regulatory risk
on the drug's profitability."'
considerations that a reasonable investor would consider as having
altered the "total mix" of information available." 2 So, not only are
the drug's potential negative effects on patients a factor to be
considered, but the regulatory implications are also important
factors for investors. Since the FDA does not directly base these
decisions on statistical significance, the adverse events may be
material in the absence of such significance.
As such,
pharmaceutical companies should consider what effects any
adverse event report could have on potential FDA regulatory
actions and whether these regulatory risks could potentially make
an otherwise accurate statement misleading.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's recent decision resolved the circuit split
concerning the materiality standard under Rule 10(b)-5 as it
applies to adverse event reports. Even though this decision merely
reaffirms the standard set forth in 1988 by the Court in Basic Inc.
v. Levinson, it provides some additional guidance for
pharmaceutical companies concerning the disclosure of adverse
event reports while retaining the investor protection features the
rule was intended to provide.
"o Matrixx Initiatives Inc. v. Siracusano, No. 09-1156, slip op. at 13-14 (U.S.
Mar. 22, 2011); see also id. at 14 n.9.
"' See generally GAO, M. Crosse et al., Drug Safety: Improvement Needed
in FDA's Postmarket Decision-making and Oversight Process, GAO-06-402
(2006).
112 See generally Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 517
(7th Cir. 1989) (suggesting that regulatory risk is an issue of materiality).

